>The show I saw also mentioned that Truman had been kept out of the inner circle by FDR and that he was looking for an excuse to flex his muscles and prove he was "a good leader" to the American people. Makes you sick, doesn't it?<
Oh, yes, some of the links I posted point this. Truman knew of a secret weapon, but not its true power. You can say he was mislead to some extent, though some very important people, including Nimitz, Eisenhower, and many others expressed openly their opposition to the use of the bomb.
Also, Truman gave the explicit order that it should be dropped in military targets, which was not the case. In fact, Hiroshima was explicitly chosen by the advisors because it was among the cities which had endured less bombings, and they wanted an area that could show clearly what the new weapon could do. BTW, Kyoto had been chosen as main target firstly
This is the sick and sad reality that can be found going through the reports of those who participated in any way in the decision.
>It doesn't look at other motives for dropping the bombs.
It concentrates mainly on Nagasaki and the question of whether the dropping of the second bombing could in any shape, form, or fashion be justified.<
Well, many things had been said about the real causes of the use of the bombs, including salvaging the lives of a million American soldiers that would have potentially died in an invasion of Japan. However, in some of the links I provided there are excerpts from reports of the period that clearly shows that the bombs ultimate political target was the Soviet Union. Truman had talked with Stalin face to face, and had hinted it, though he thought at the time that Stalin had misunderstood him (in fact, the Soviet Union was well aware that the US was developing the bomb). But there are more evidences. Stalin had agreed with the Allies an invasion of the Soviet Army to Japan to be launched in August 8, 1945. The first bomb was dropped in August 6, the second in August 9. The invasion, obviously, never took place, but if it would, the most likely scenario would have been something kin to what happened in Eastern Europe. It was evident that the US wanted to avoid it to all costs. The third
element is that Japan was trying BY ALL MEANS AVAILABLE to reach an honorable surrender. Japan had made it clear through Switzerland and finally had asked the Soviet Union to serve as a 'bridge' to achieve an armistice with the US. In fact, at the same time that the order for the bombings had been issued, negotiations were being held for an honorable, conditional surrender.
Nagasaki bombing was designed specifically as a show of strength. The first plan included the attack to several Japanese cities at the same time, but it was discarded, to increase the strength of the psychological blow.
When you look at the historical evidence, the bombings should never have happened. But common people is always caught in the middle of political and economical considerations.
All in all, yes, it was a crime of war. But who is free from sin ?
Anyway, I think you might find these quotes interesting. I took them from some of the sites I mentioned. It's long, but gives some insight:
Excerpt from Truman Diary: "This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10. I have told the secretary of war, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old capital or the new. He and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one and we will issue a warning statement asking the Japs to surrender and save lives. I'm sure they will not do that, but we will have given them the chance. It is certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler's crowd or Stalin's did not discover this atomic bomb. It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful."
� In his memoirs Admiral William D. Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff--and the top official who presided over meetings of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined U.S.-U.K. Chiefs of Staff--minced few words:
[T]he use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender. . . .
[I]n being the first to use it, we . . . adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children. (See p. 3, Introduction)
Privately, on June 18, 1945--almost a month before the Emperor's July intervention to seek an end to the war and seven weeks before the atomic bomb was used--Leahy recorded in his diary:
It is my opinion at the present time that a surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provisions for America's defense against future trans-Pacific aggression. (See p. 324, Chapter 26)
� Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet stated in a public address given at the Washington Monument on October 5, 1945:
The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into the war. (See p. 329, Chapter 26) . . . [Nimitz also stated: "The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan. . . ."]
In a private 1946 letter to Walter Michels of the Association of Philadelphia Scientists, Nimitz observed that "the decision to employ the atomic bomb on Japanese cities was made on a level higher than that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." (See pp. 330-331, Chapter 26)
� Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander U.S. Third Fleet, stated publicly in 1946:
The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. . . . It was a mistake to ever drop it. . . . [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it. . . . It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before. (See p. 331, Chapter 26)
� The Under-Secretary of the Navy, Ralph Bard, formally dissented from the Interim Committee's recommendation to use the bomb against a city without warning. In a June 27, 1945 memorandum Bard declared:
Ever since I have been in touch with this program I have had a feeling that before the bomb is actually used against Japan that Japan should have some preliminary warning for say two or three days in advance of use. The position of the United States as a great humanitarian nation and the fair play attitude of our people generally is responsible in the main for this feeling.
During recent weeks I have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese government may be searching for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender. Following the three-power conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia's position and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.
I don't see that we have anything in particular to lose in following such a program. The stakes are so tremendous that it is my opinion very real consideration should be given to some plan of this kind. I do not believe under present circumstances existing that there is anyone in the country whose evaluation of the chances of the success of such a program is worth a great deal. The only way to find out is to try it out. (See pp. 225-226, Chapter 18)
General Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, who in July 1945 commanded the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force (USASTAF) and was subsequently chief of staff of U.S. Air Forces stated that he had directly challenged the Nagasaki bombing:
I thought that if we were going to drop the atomic bomb, drop it on the outskirts--say in Tokyo Bay--so that the effects would not be as devastating to the city and the people. I made this suggestion over the phone between the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and I was told to go ahead with our targets. (See p. 345, Chapter 27)
� Colonel Charles "Tick" Bonesteel, 1945 chief of the War Department Operations Division Policy Section, subsequently recalled in a military history interview: "[T]he poor damn Japanese were putting feelers out by the ton so to speak, through Russia. . . ." (See p. 359, Chapter 28)
� Brigadier Gen. Carter W. Clarke, the officer in charge of preparing MAGIC intercepted cable summaries in 1945, stated in a 1959 interview:
we brought them [the Japanese] down to an abject surrender through the accelerated sinking of their merchant marine and hunger alone, and when we didn't need to do it, and we knew we didn't need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn't need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs. (See p. 359, Chapter 28)
� In his memoirs President Dwight D. Eisenhower reports the following reaction when Secretary of War Stimson informed him the atomic bomb would be used:
During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. . . . (See p. 4, Introduction)
� Eisenhower made similar private and public statements on numerous occasions. For instance, in a 1963 interview he said simply: "Japan was at that very moment seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'... It wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing." (General Eisenhower). (See pp. 352-358, Chapter 28)
Quote: ***Upon becoming President in April 1945, Harry Truman inherited a very expensive bomb project that had always aimed at producing a military weapon. President Truman came into office with no knowledge of the atomic bomb, because Roosevelt had never revealed to him the secret at the heart of the Manhattan Project.
According to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, however, "the decision whether or not to use the atomic bomb...was never even an issue." Furthermore, he was faced with the prospect of an invasion and he was told that the bomb would be useful for impressing the Soviet Union. He therefore saw no reason to avoid using the bomb. Alternatives for ending the Pacific war other than an invasion of atomic-bombing were available, but are more obvious in hindsight than they were at the time. Truman was aware of the existence of the Manhattan Project while a Senator, but respected the Administration's request that he not inquire into its nature. As President, he held ultimate responsibility for the decision to use the atomic bomb. After the war, he claimed that he never once had moral qualms about the bombings, but his own diaries and letters indicate that this was not entirely the case.***
.
Quote: There had been four cities chosen as possible targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Nagasaki, and Niigata (Kyoto was the first choice until it was removed from the list by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson). The cities were chosen because they had been otherwise relatively untouched during the war. The Target Committee wanted the first bomb to be "sufficiently spectacular for the importance of the weapon to be internationally recognized when publicity on it was released."3
Unlike many other bombing raids, the goal for this raid had not been a military installation but rather an entire city. The atomic bomb that exploded over Hiroshima killed civilian women and children in addition to soldiers. Hiroshima's population has been estimated at 350,000; approximately 70,000 died immediately from the explosion and another 70,000 died from radiation within five years. While the people of Japan tried to comprehend the devastation in Hiroshima, the United States was preparing a second bombing mission. The second run was scheduled not to give Japan time to surrender, but was waiting only for a sufficient amount of plutonium-239 for the atomic bomb.
Quote:
If Japan was ready to surrender, there must have been another reason for the atom bombs to have been used. This, unbelievable as it might seem, was to make a point to the Soviet Union.
Vannevar Bush (Chief Aide for atomic matters to Stimson, the Secretary of State for War) confirmed this when he said that the bomb was: "delivered on time so there was no necessity for any concessions to Russia at the end of the war."
The US did not want the Soviet Union to be involved in the anticipated 'last push' land invasion of Northern China, since this would put it in a good position to exert influence in the area once hostilities ceased. The US therefore attempted to end the fighting before the Red Army entered Chinese territory but did not accept Japanese moves to surrender, leaving President Truman confident about finishing the war in the Far East with as little help from Russia as possible.
Truman postponed meeting Churchill and Stalin to discuss post-war territorial control until after July 16, when the first ever atomic explosion took place as the US tested its new weapon in New Mexico. Truman went to Potsdam, Germany, the very next day buoyed by the conviction that he had a weapon which would, as predicted by his Secretary of State, James Byrnes, "make Russia more manageable in Europe."
The Hiroshima bomb was dropped on 6 August. The message to the Japanese must have been unmistakable and it is difficult to imagine why a second one should have been used on August 9. Except that the Soviet Union was due to enter the war in that week and the US wanted to demonstrate to the Soviets the awesome power that they would be dealing with once the war was over.
In part because he wanted to wait until the bomb was ready, President Truman ignored advice in May 1945 from Acting Secretary of State Grew that changing the surrender terms might well halt the fighting. Some came to believe that this actually cost lives. Stimson, Secretary of State for War, said: "History might find that the US, by its delay in stating its position, had prolonged the war."
Quote:
NUCLEAR VERSUS CONVENTIONAL BOMBING
Many of the decision-makers knowledgeable about the bomb did not consider it drastically different from conventional strategic bombing, which had already killed hundreds of thousands of civilians throughout the world. Nor was there any guarantee that the bomb would automatically end the war.
When Oppenheimer suggested on May 31 that several atomic attacks be carried out on the same day to shock the Japanese, Groves opposed the idea on the grounds that "the effect would not be sufficiently distinct from our regular air force [bombing] program." At that time, the firebombing of Japan had already devastated many cities. The explosive power of the first atomic bombs was also estimated at only 1/10th to 1/2 of what it turned out to be, and no one had a clear impression of the heat and radiation effects. (end of quote)
----- Original Message -----
From: Warg3791@...
To: SHQ@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2004 7:03 PM
Subject: Re: [SHQ] Re: Parents were Shinsengumi fans?
In a message dated 4/27/2004 1:51:52 PM Eastern Daylight Time, wtiger_consort@... writes:
> Also, you must se the bombings in the whole context. As Japan would have surrendered in October (the most extreme date, according to intelligence reports of the period), the bombings should not and cannot see in the context of ending the Pacific War. The reality shows that, since Truman had already warned Stalin about a weapon of unprecedented power that was in US hands, the whole thing should be regarded as a direct warning to the other emerging superpower of the period, which the US feared would try to take the chance to expand its territorial and ideological influence in the Asian area.
> After all, the atomic bombings didn't mark the end of the Second World War as much as the beginning of the Cold War. The physical target was Japan, but the message had been delivered to the Soviet Union, since the Us didn't expect them to develop nuclear weapons for at least one or two decades (they had it within five years from Hiroshima bombing)
>
> Last but not least, though the bombings were barbaric, and from a purely legal POV could even be considered a crime against humanity, Japan had a sad record on those crimes too. Nangkin, Korea and the Philippines, among others are witness to
> this.
This is actually not the first time I've heard that. I saw a program on the History Channel not too long ago that pointed out the same thing. Frankly, I found it to be very logical and I'm now of the opinion that this is probably what was really behind the decision. The show I saw also mentioned that Truman had been kept out of the inner circle by FDR and that he was looking for an excuse to flex his muscles and prove he was "a good leader" to the American people. Makes you sick, doesn't it?
The book that I mentioned argues that some of our leaders at the time could have and should have been charged with war crimes. (I need to re-read it. There seems to have been some demands that this happen at the time and not just from the Japanese.) It doesn't look at other motives for dropping the bombs. It concentrates mainly on Nagasaki and the question of whether the dropping of the second bombing could in any shape, form, or fashion be justified. The answer is a resounding NO. IF the bombs had been dropped for the reasons the U.S. claimed, then Hiroshima was more than enough to convince the Japanese to surrender. Nagasaki was COMPLETELY unnecessary and those responsible should have been considered war criminals and treated accordingly.
Just thought I'd share a bit about what it was saying.
-MissBehavin
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